Silicon speedpath measurement and feedback into EDA flows
Proceedings of the 44th annual Design Automation Conference
Randomization Based Probabilistic Approach to Detect Trojan Circuits
HASE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 11th IEEE High Assurance Systems Engineering Symposium
A Novel Sustained Vector Technique for the Detection of Hardware Trojans
VLSID '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd International Conference on VLSI Design
Path-RO: a novel on-chip critical path delay measurement under process variations
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Sensitivity analysis to hardware Trojans using power supply transient signals
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan Horse detection
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware Trojan detection using path delay fingerprint
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Extended abstract: Designer's hardware Trojan horse
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware Trojan horse detection using gate-level characterization
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Design Automation Conference
New design strategy for improving hardware Trojan detection and reducing Trojan activation time
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and Detection
IEEE Design & Test
Statistical Timing Analysis: From Basic Principles to State of the Art
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
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This work offers a framework which does not rely on a Golden IC (GIC) during hardware Trojan (HT) detection. GIC is a Trojan-free IC which is required, in all existing HT frameworks, as a reference point to verify the responses obtained from an IC under authentication. However, identifying a GIC is not a trivial task. A GIC may not even exist, since all the fabricated ICs may be HT-infected. We propose a framework which is based on adding a set of detection sensors to a design which are integrated in the free spaces on the layout and fabricated on the same die. After fabrication, a self-authentication procedure is proposed in order to determine if a Trojan is inserted in a set of arbitrarily-selected paths in the design. The detection process uses on-chip measurements on the sensors and the design paths in order to evaluate the correlation between a set of actual and predicted delay ranges. Error in the on-chip measurement infrastructure is considered. If our framework determines that a Trojan is (or is not) inserted on a considered path, then it is accurate. In our computational experiments, conducted for challenging cases of small Trojan circuits in the presence of die-to-die and within-die process variations, we report a high detection rate to show its effectiveness in realizing a self-authentication process which is independent of a GIC.