Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Consistency-based characterization for IC Trojan detection
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
A Trojan-resistant system-on-chip bus architecture
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
Detecting Trojans through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad IDDQS
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Exploiting the critical infrastructure via nontraditional system inputs
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Red team vs. blue team hardware trojan analysis: detection of a hardware trojan on an actual ASIC
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
Detection of trojans using a combined ring oscillator network and off-chip transient power analysis
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC)
Hardware trojan design and detection: a practical evaluation
Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
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This paper addresses a new threat to the security of integrated circuits (ICs) used in safety critical, security and military systems. The migration of IC fabrication to low-cost foundries has made ICs vulnerable to malicious alterations, that could, under specific conditions, result in functional changes and/or catastrophic failure of the system in which they are embedded. We refer to such malicious alternations and inclusions as Hardware Trojans. The modification(s) introduced by the Trojan depends on the application, with some designed to disable the system or degrade signal integrity, while others are designed to defeat hardware security and encryption to leak plain text information. This paper explores the wide range of malicious alternations of ICs that are possible and proposes a general framework for their classification. The taxonomy is essential for properly evaluating the effectiveness of methods designed to detect Trojans. The latter portion of the paper explores several Trojan detection strategies and the classes of Trojans each is most likely to detect.