Security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Results concerning the bandwidth of subliminal channels
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
On the limits of steganography
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Access for sale: a new class of worm
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode
IP covert timing channels: design and detection
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 9th workshop on Multimedia & security
Detecting covert timing channels: an entropy-based approach
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A novel covert channel based on the IP header record route option
International Journal of Advanced Media and Communication
A Supraliminal Channel in a Videoconferencing Application
Information Hiding
OTM '08 Proceedings of the OTM 2008 Confederated International Conferences, CoopIS, DOA, GADA, IS, and ODBASE 2008. Part II on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Covert channels in ad-hoc wireless networks
Ad Hoc Networks
GIIS'09 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Global Information Infrastructure Symposium
Analyzing network-aware active wardens in IPv6
IH'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information hiding
Embedding a covert channel in active network connections
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Hide and seek in time: robust covert timing channels
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Summary-invisible networking: techniques and defenses
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
CoCo: coding-based covert timing channels for network flows
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
BridgeSPA: improving Tor bridges with single packet authorization
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
An exploration of L2 cache covert channels in virtualized environments
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
Cirripede: circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The research on information hiding based on command sequence of FTP protocol
KES'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems - Volume Part III
Embedding covert channels into TCP/IP
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
Traceroute based IP channel for sending hidden short messages
IWSEC'06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Security
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Steganography in streaming multimedia over networks
Transactions on Data Hiding and Multimedia Security VII
Language-based control and mitigation of timing channels
Proceedings of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation
Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response
Systematic engineering of control protocols for covert channels
CMS'12 Proceedings of the 13th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Moving steganography and steganalysis from the laboratory into the real world
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Information hiding and multimedia security
From an IP address to a street address: using wireless signals to locate a target
WOOT'13 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies
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Covert channels exist in most communications systems and allow individuals to communicate truly undectably. However, covert channels are seldom used due to their complexity. A protocol for sending data over a common class of low-bandwidth covert channels has been developed. The protocol is secure against attack by powerful adversaries. The design of a practical system implementing the protocol on a standard platform (Linux) exploiting a channel in a common communications system (TCP timestamps) is presented. A partial implementation of this system has been accomplished.