Summary-invisible networking: techniques and defenses

  • Authors:
  • Lei Wei;Michael K. Reiter;Ketan Mayer-Patel

  • Affiliations:
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC;University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC;University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC

  • Venue:
  • ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Numerous network anomaly detection techniques utilize traffic summaries (e.g., NetFlow records) to detect and diagnose attacks. In this paper we investigate the limits of such approaches, by introducing a technique by which compromised hosts can communicate without altering the behavior of the network as evidenced in summary records of many common types. Our technique builds on two key observations. First, network anomaly detection based on payload-oblivious traffic summaries admits a new type of covert embedding in which compromised nodes embed content in the space vacated by compressing the payloads of packets already in transit between them. Second, point-to-point covert channels can serve as a "data link layer" over which routing protocols can be run, enabling more functional covert networking than previously explored. We investigate the combination of these ideas, which we term Summary-Invisible Networking (SIN), to determine both the covert networking capacities that an attacker can realize in various tasks and the possibilities for defenders to detect these activities.