An exploration of L2 cache covert channels in virtualized environments

Authors:
Yunjing Xu;Michael Bailey;Farnam Jahanian;Kaustubh Joshi;Matti Hiltunen;Richard Schlichting
Affiliations:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA;University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA;University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA;AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA;AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA;AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Recent exploration into the unique security challenges of cloud computing have shown that when virtual machines belonging to different customers share the same physical machine, new forms of cross-VM covert channel communication arise. In this paper, we explore one of these threats, L2 cache covert channels, and demonstrate the limits of these this threat by providing a quantification of the channel bit rates and an assessment of its ability to do harm. Through progressively refining models of cross-VM covert channels from the derived maximums, to implementable channels in the lab, and finally in Amazon EC2 itself we show how a variety of factors impact our ability to create effective channels. While we demonstrate a covert channel with considerably higher bit rate than previously reported, we assess that even at such improved rates, the harm of data exfiltration from these channels is still limited to the sharing of small, if important, secrets such as private keys.