Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
Introducing Tarzan, a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Design principles for low latency anonymous network systems secure against timing attacks
ACSW '07 Proceedings of the fifth Australasian symposium on ACSW frontiers - Volume 68
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Rumor Riding: Anonymizing Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Systems
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
How to break a practical MIX and design a new one
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Recruiting new tor relays with BRAIDS
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An improved algorithm for tor circuit scheduling
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CONCUR'10 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Concurrency theory
Traffic analysis against low-latency anonymity networks using available bandwidth estimation
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
MOR: monitoring and measurements through the onion router
PAM'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Passive and active measurement
Anonymity analysis of P2P anonymous communication systems
Computer Communications
An algorithm for available bandwidth estimation of IPv6 network
ADMA'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Advanced data mining and applications - Volume Part II
Beyond simulation: large-scale distributed emulation of P2P protocols
CSET'11 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Cyber security experimentation and test
DefenestraTor: throwing out windows in Tor
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
"Mix-in-Place" anonymous networking using secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
"Super nodes" in Tor: existence and security implication
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Using sphinx to improve onion routing circuit construction
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Malice versus AN.ON: possible risks of missing replay and integrity protection
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Beyond TOR: the truenyms protocol
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
Website detection using remote traffic analysis
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Spying in the dark: TCP and tor traffic analysis
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Throttling Tor bandwidth parasites
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
A new cell-counting-based attack against Tor
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Torchestra: reducing interactive traffic delays over tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Message in a bottle: sailing past censorship
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
SGor: Trust graph based onion routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
How to block Tor's hidden bridges: detecting methods and countermeasures
The Journal of Supercomputing
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In 2005, Murdoch and Danezis demonstrated the first practical congestion attack against a deployed anonymity network. They could identify which relays were on a target Tor user's path by building paths one at a time through every Tor relay and introducing congestion. However, the original attack was performed on only 13 Tor relays on the nascent and lightly loaded Tor network. We show that the attack from their paper is no longer practical on today's 1500-relay heavily loaded Tor network. The attack doesn't scale because a) the attacker needs a tremendous amount of bandwidth to measure enough relays during the attack window, and b) there are too many false positives now that many other users are adding congestion at the same time as the attacks. We then strengthen the original congestion attack by combining it with a novel bandwidth amplification attack based on a flaw in the Tor design that lets us build long circuits that loop back on themselves. We show that this new combination attack is practical and effective by demonstrating a working attack on today's deployed Tor network. By coming up with a model to better understand Tor's routing behavior under congestion, we further provide a statistical analysis characterizing how effective our attack is in each case.