Communications of the ACM
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Propagation of trust and distrust
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on World Wide Web
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Information revelation and privacy in online social networks
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
User interactions in social networks and their implications
Proceedings of the 4th ACM European conference on Computer systems
Sybil-resilient online content voting
NSDI'09 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX symposium on Networked systems design and implementation
On the evolution of user interaction in Facebook
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Online social networks
More Anonymous Onion Routing Through Trust
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
You are who you know: inferring user profiles in online social networks
Proceedings of the third ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Correlation-Based Traffic Analysis Attacks on Anonymity Networks
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Drac: an architecture for anonymous low-volume communications
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
On the secrecy of spread-spectrum flow watermarks
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
SybilLimit: a near-optimal social network defense against sybil attacks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Sybil defenses via social networks: a tutorial and survey
ACM SIGACT News
Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Analyzing facebook privacy settings: user expectations vs. reality
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
The socialbot network: when bots socialize for fame and money
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Exposing invisible timing-based traffic watermarks with BACKLIT
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A new cell-counting-based attack against Tor
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Protocol-level attacks against Tor
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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The use of trust for onion routing has been proved effective in thwarting malicious onion routers. However, even state-of-the-art trust-based onion routing protocols still suffer from two key limitations in protecting anonymity. First, these protocols have no means to verify the correctness of the trust they rely on. Second, they run a high risk of being deanonymized by an inference attack due to biased trust distributions. In this paper, we propose SGor, a trust graph based onion routing that mitigates the key limitations of trust in protecting anonymity. SGor is novel with three unique properties. First, SGor aggregates group trust from mutual friends to verify the correctness of users' trust assignments. Second, SGor employs an adaptive trust propagation algorithm to derive global trust from trust graph. The global trust removes the restriction of users' local knowledge and defeats inference attacks by guiding users to discover and trust more honest routers (i.e., reducing the bias of trust distribution). Third, SGor is designed to operate in a fully decentralized manner. This decentralized design mitigates the leakage of a priori trust relationships. We evaluate SGor with simulation-based experiments using several real-world social trust datasets. The experimental results confirm that SGor can mitigate key limitations in the use of trust for protecting anonymity but introduces only a few overheads.