Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Sleepy Watermark Tracing: An Active Network-Based Intrusion Response Framework
IFIP/Sec '01 Proceedings of the IFIP TC11 Sixteenth Annual Working Conference on Information Security: Trusted Information: The New Decade Challenge
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On Flow Marking Attacks in Wireless Anonymous Communication Networks
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On the Secrecy of Timing-Based Active Watermarking Trace-Back Techniques
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Route Fingerprinting in Anonymous Communications
P2P '06 Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
DSSS-Based Flow Marking Technique for Invisible Traceback
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Network Flow Watermarking Attack on Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
NetCamo: camouflaging network traffic for QoS-guaranteed mission critical applications
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
SGor: Trust graph based onion routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Tor is a real-world, circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication network, supporting TCP applications over the Internet. In this paper, we present an extensive study of protocol-level attacks against Tor. Different from existing attacks, the attacks investigated in this paper can confirm anonymous communication relationships quickly and accurately by manipulating one single cell and pose a serious threat against Tor. In these attacks, a malicious entry onion router may duplicate, modify, insert, or delete cells of a TCP stream from a sender, which can cause cell recognition errors at the exit onion router. If an accomplice of the attacker at the entry onion router also controls the exit onion router and recognizes such cell recognition errors, the communication relationship between the sender and receiver will be confirmed. These attacks can also be used for launching the denial-of-service (DoS) attack to disrupt the operation of Tor. We systematically analyze the impact of these attacks and our data indicate that these attacks may drastically degrade the anonymity service that Tor provides, if the attacker is able to control a small number of Tor routers. We have implemented these attacks on Tor and our experiments validate their feasibility and effectiveness. We also present guidelines for defending against protocol-level attacks.