Drac: an architecture for anonymous low-volume communications
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
SGor: Trust graph based onion routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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We consider using trust information to improve the anonymity provided byonion-routing networks. In particular, we introduce a model of trustin network nodes and use it to design path-selection strategies thatminimize the probability that the adversary can successfully control the entrance to and exit from the network.This minimizes the chance that the adversary can observe and correlate patterns in the data flowing over the path and thereby deanonymize the user. We first describe the general case in whichonion routers can be assigned arbitrary levels of trust.Selecting a strategy can be formulated in a straightforward way as a linear program,but it is exponential in size.We thus analyze a natural simplificationof path selection for this case. More importantly, however, whenchoosing routes in practice, only a very coarse assessment of trustin specific onion routers is likely to be feasible.Therefore, we focusnext on the special case in which there are only two trustlevels. For this more practical case we identify threeoptimal route-selection strategies such that at least one is optimal, depending on thetrust levels of the two classes, their size, and the reach of theadversary. This can yieldpractical input into routing decisions. We set out the relevant parameters and choices for makingsuch decisions.