Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
P5: A Protocol for Scalable Anonymous Communication
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An Optimal Strategy for Anonymous Communication Protocols
ICDCS '02 Proceedings of the 22 nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'02)
Fundamental Limits on the Anonymity Provided by the MIX Technique
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
AP3: cooperative, decentralized anonymous communication
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Rumor Riding: Anonymizing Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Systems
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Anonymous Networking with Minimum Latency in Multihop Networks
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Reputation Systems for Anonymous Networks
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Survey on anonymity in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Information slicing: anonymity using unreliable overlays
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Compared with traditional static Client/Server architecture, the P2P architecture is more suitable for anonymous communication systems because it is more flexible and can keep load balance better. However, in order to make the system usable and reliable, some system designs make tradeoffs between anonymity and performance such as reliability, latency and throughput. Tradeoffs are sometimes unavoidable in system design, but which tradeoffs are acceptable and which are not is very important for developers. This paper models the P2P anonymous communications and takes quantitative analysis of anonymity by information theory with entropy. Based on this analysis, it studies the effect of key system design strategies on anonymity in network architecture, routing and message relay, and measures which strategies should be used in anonymous communications and which are unreasonable. Some analysis results are contrary to our intuition. For example, it quantitatively concludes that in some cases the anonymity is not enhanced when the system scale increases, and too long an anonymous tunnel may not provide higher anonymity but lowers performance. These analysis results are valuable for developers of P2P anonymous communication systems. Besides, this paper also discusses some possible strategies such as trust and reputation to enhance the P2P anonymous communications.