Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
SAC '99 Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Provably Secure and Practical Identification Schemes and Corresponding Signature Schemes
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security of Blind Digital Signatures (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Strong pseudonymous communication for peer-to-peer reputation systems
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Avoiding ballot stuffing in eBay-like reputation systems
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
A Privacy Preserving Reputation System for Mobile Information Dissemination Networks
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Fundamental Limits on the Anonymity Provided by the MIX Technique
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Making p2p accountable without losing privacy
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Nymble: anonymous IP-address blocking
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
P-signatures and noninteractive anonymous credentials
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Privacy and liveliness for reputation systems
EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
Anonymity analysis of P2P anonymous communication systems
Computer Communications
Privacy-enhanced reputation-feedback methods to reduce feedback extortion in online auctions
Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
Privacy, liveliness and fairness for reputation
SOFSEM'11 Proceedings of the 37th international conference on Current trends in theory and practice of computer science
Trust your social network according to satisfaction, reputation and privacy
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Reliability, Availability, and Security
DPM'10/SETOP'10 Proceedings of the 5th international Workshop on data privacy management, and 3rd international conference on Autonomous spontaneous security
On the limits of privacy in reputation systems
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
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We present a reputation scheme for a pseudonymous peer-to-peer (P2P) system in an anonymous network. Misbehavior is one of the biggest problems in pseudonymous P2P systems, where there is little incentive for proper behavior. In our scheme, using ecash for reputation points, the reputation of each user is closely related to his real identity rather than to his current pseudonym. Thus, our scheme allows an honest user to switch to a new pseudonym keeping his good reputation, while hindering a malicious user from erasing his trail of evil deeds with a new pseudonym.