The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability in spite of active attacks
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Universal hashing and authentication codes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communications of the ACM
Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits
Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits
Research Note---How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile?
Information Systems Research
Reputation Systems for Anonymous Networks
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A verifiable, centralized, coercion-free reputation system
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Privacy and liveliness for reputation systems
EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
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In various Internet applications, reputation systems are typical means to collect experiences users make with each other. We present a reputation system that balances the security and privacy requirements of all users involed. Our system provides privacy in the form of information theoretic relationship anonymity w.r.t. users and the reputation provider. Furthermore, it preserves liveliness, i.e., all past ratings can influence the current reputation profile of a user. In addition, mutual ratings are forced to be simultaneous and self rating is prevented, which enforces fairness. What is more, without performing mock interactions--even if all users are colluding--users cannot forge ratings. As far as we know, this is the first protocol proposed that fulfills all these properties simultaneously.