Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
PlanetLab: an overlay testbed for broad-coverage services
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Using PlanetLab for network research: myths, realities, and best practices
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Detecting in-flight page changes with web tripwires
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Compromising Anonymity Using Packet Spinning
ISC '08 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information Security
Robust defenses for cross-site request forgery
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
One-click hosting services: a file-sharing hideout
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
The internet is not a big truck: toward quantifying network neutrality
PAM'07 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Passive and active network measurement
GAS: overloading a file sharing network as an anonymizing system
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Misusing unstructured p2p systems to perform dos attacks: the network that never forgets
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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A free and easy to use distributed monitoring and measurement platform would be valuable in several applications: monitoring network or server infrastructures, performing research experiments using many ISPs and test nodes, or checking for network neutrality violations performed by service providers. In this paper we present MOR, a technique for performing distributed measurement and monitoring tasks using the geographically diverse infrastructure of the Tor anonymizing network. Through several case studies, we show the applicability and value of MOR in revealing the structure and function of large hosting infrastructures and detecting network neutrality violations. Our experiments show that about 7.5% of the tested organizations block at least one popular application port and about 5.5% of them modify HTTP headers.