Efficient fair queueing using deficit round-robin
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Dummynet: a simple approach to the evaluation of network protocols
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A measurement study of available bandwidth estimation tools
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Some findings on the network performance of broadband hosts
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
An empirical evaluation of wide-area internet bottlenecks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of internet miscreants
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Devices that tell on you: privacy trends in consumer ubiquitous computing
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
On web browsing privacy in anonymized NetFlows
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Identifying Proxy Nodes in a Tor Anonymization Circuit
SITIS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Conference on Signal Image Technology and Internet Based Systems
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Fingerprinting websites using traffic analysis
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: A Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Peeping tom in the neighborhood: keystroke eavesdropping on multi-user systems
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted Voice over IP Conversations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Phonotactic Reconstruction of Encrypted VoIP Conversations: Hookt on Fon-iks
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Bandwidth estimation: metrics, measurement techniques, and tools
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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Recent work in traffic analysis has shown that traffic patterns leaked through side channels can be used to recover important semantic information. For instance, attackers can find out which website, or which page on a website, a user is accessing simply by monitoring the packet size distribution. We show that traffic analysis is even a greater threat to privacy than previously thought by introducing a new attack that can be carried out remotely. In particular, we show that, to perform traffic analysis, adversaries do not need to directly observe the traffic patterns. Instead, they can gain sufficient information by sending probes from a far-off vantage point that exploits a queuing side channel in routers. To demonstrate the threat of such remote traffic analysis, we study a remote website detection attack that works against home broadband users. Because the remotely observed traffic patterns are more noisy than those obtained using previous schemes based on direct local traffic monitoring, we take a dynamic time warping (DTW) based approach to detecting fingerprints from the same website. As a new twist on website fingerprinting, we consider a website detection attack, where the attacker aims to find out whether a user browses a particular web site, and its privacy implications. We show experimentally that, although the success of the attack is highly variable, depending on the target site, for some sites very low error rates. We also show how such website detection can be used to deanonymize message board users.