Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Revealing skype traffic: when randomness plays with you
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Language identification of encrypted VoIP traffic: Alejandra y Roberto or Alice and Bob?
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Devices that tell on you: privacy trends in consumer ubiquitous computing
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tunnel Hunter: Detecting application-layer tunnels with statistical fingerprinting
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
IEEE Transactions on Computers
On the risks of serving whenever you surf: vulnerabilities in Tor's blocking resistance design
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Chipping away at censorship firewalls with user-generated content
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Phonotactic Reconstruction of Encrypted VoIP Conversations: Hookt on Fon-iks
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Telex: anticensorship in the network infrastructure
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
BridgeSPA: improving Tor bridges with single packet authorization
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Cirripede: circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Protocol misidentification made easy with format-transforming encryption
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Cover your ACKs: pitfalls of covert channel censorship circumvention
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
A Taxonomy of Censors and Anti-Censors Part II: Anti-Censorship Technologies
International Journal of E-Politics
ScrambleSuit: a polymorphic network protocol to circumvent censorship
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Proactively accountable anonymous messaging in verdict
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
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The Tor network is designed to provide users with low-latency anonymous communications. Tor clients build circuits with publicly listed relays to anonymously reach their destinations. However, since the relays are publicly listed, they can be easily blocked by censoring adversaries. Consequently, the Tor project envisioned the possibility of unlisted entry points to the Tor network, commonly known as bridges. We address the issue of preventing censors from detecting the bridges by observing the communications between them and nodes in their network. We propose a model in which the client obfuscates its messages to the bridge in a widely used protocol over the Internet. We investigate using Skype video calls as our target protocol and our goal is to make it difficult for the censoring adversary to distinguish between the obfuscated bridge connections and actual Skype calls using statistical comparisons. We have implemented our model as a proof-of-concept pluggable transport for Tor, which is available under an open-source licence. Using this implementation we observed the obfuscated bridge communications and compared it with those of Skype calls and presented the results.