Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A reputation-based approach for choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Modelling misbehaviour in ad hoc networks: a game theoretic approach for intrusion detection
International Journal of Security and Networks
PAR: Payment for Anonymous Routing
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Scalable onion routing with torsk
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
XPay: practical anonymous payments for tor routing and other networked services
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Decentralized detector generation in cooperative intrusion detection systems
SSS'07 Proceedings of the 9h international conference on Stabilization, safety, and security of distributed systems
Recruiting new tor relays with BRAIDS
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CONCUR'10 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Concurrency theory
Probable innocence in the presence of independent knowledge
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Synchronous batching: from cascades to free routes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networks
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networks
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Formalising security in ubiquitous and cloud scenarios
CISIM'12 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 8 international conference on Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management
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Anonymity systems are of paramount and growing importance in communication networks. They rely on users to cooperate to the realisation of an effective anonymity service. Yet, existing systems are marred by the action of ‘selfish' free-loaders, so that several cooperation incentives are being proposed. We propose a game-theoretic model of incentives in anonymity networks based on parametric utility functions, which make it flexible, adaptable and realistic. We then use the framework to analyse the cost of cooperation and the performance of the gold-star incentive scheme in the Crowds protocol.