Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
PlanetLab: an overlay testbed for broad-coverage services
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An introduction to ROC analysis
Pattern Recognition Letters - Special issue: ROC analysis in pattern recognition
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Design principles for low latency anonymous network systems secure against timing attacks
ACSW '07 Proceedings of the fifth Australasian symposium on ACSW frontiers - Volume 68
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The bittorrent p2p file-sharing system: measurements and analysis
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Breaking the collusion detection mechanism of morphmix
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Recruiting new tor relays with BRAIDS
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CONCUR'10 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Concurrency theory
Pr2-P2PSIP: privacy preserving P2P signaling for VoIP and IM
Principles, Systems and Applications of IP Telecommunications
Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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At Oakland 2005, Murdoch and Danezis described an attack on the Tor anonymity service that recovers the nodes in a Tor circuit, but not the client. We observe that in a peer-to-peer anonymity scheme, the client is part of the circuit and thus the technique can be of greater significance in this setting. We experimentally validate this conclusion by showing that "circuit clogging" can identify client nodes using the MorphMix peer-to-peer anonymity protocol. We also propose and empirically validate the use of the Stochastic Fair Queueing discipline on outgoing connections as an efficient and low-cost mitigation technique.