Asynchronous secure computation
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Practical loss-resilient codes
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A scalable content-addressable network
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Censorship resistant peer-to-peer content addressable networks
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Asynchronous Unconditionally Secure Computation: An Efficiency Improvement
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Tapestry: An Infrastructure for Fault-tolerant Wide-area Location and
Tapestry: An Infrastructure for Fault-tolerant Wide-area Location and
Towards a scalable and robust DHT
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Making chord robust to byzantine attacks
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Sleeping on the job: energy-efficient and robust broadcast for radio networks
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Membership-concealing overlay networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Commensal cuckoo: secure group partitioning for large-scale services
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Towards practical communication in Byzantine-resistant DHTs
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Several recent research results describe how to design Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) that are robust to adversarial attack via Byzantine faults. Unfortunately, all of these results require a significant blowup in communication costs over standard DHTs. For example, to perform a lookup operation, all such robust DHTs of which we are aware require sending O(log^3n) messages while standard DHTs require sending only O(logn), where n is the number of nodes in the network. In this paper, we describe protocols to reduce the communication costs of all such robust DHTs. In particular, we give a protocol to reduce the number of messages sent to perform a lookup operation from O(log^3n) to O(log^2n) in expectation. Moreover, we also give a protocol for sending a large (i.e. containing @W(log^4n) bits) message securely through a robust DHT that requires, in expectation, only a constant blowup in the total number of bits sent compared with performing the same operation in a standard DHT. This is an improvement over the O(log^2n) bit blowup that is required to perform such an operation in all current robust DHTs. Both of our protocols are robust against an adaptive adversary.