The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Cryptography and data security
Cryptography and data security
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Measuring relationship anonymity in mix networks
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Quantitative analysis of leakage for multi-threaded programs
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language
Journal of Computer Security
Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Attacking unlinkability: the importance of context
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Two-sided statistical disclosure attack
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Quantifying information leakage in process calculi
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Linking anonymous transactions: the consistent view attack
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Information theory and security: quantitative information flow
SFM'10 Proceedings of the Formal methods for quantitative aspects of programming languages, and 10th international conference on School on formal methods for the design of computer, communication and software systems
The optimum leakage principle for analyzing multi-threaded programs
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
Anonymity attacks on mix systems: a formal analysis
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Quantitative information flow: from theory to practice?
CAV'10 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Statistical measurement of information leakage
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
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There is a natural intuitive match between anonymity and information theory. In particular, the maximal anonymity loss in anonymity protocols can be matched to the information theoretical notion of channel capacity. However, there is also a significant mismatch between the theories and reality: current theories can only characterize channel capacity based upon certain assumptions of symmetry, which are rarely satisfied in the real world. This paper aims to resolve this mismatch by appealing to powerful mathematical techniques. A generic methodology using Lagrange multiplier method is proposed to characterize channel capacity in anonymity protocols. This Lagrangian approach is proved to be able to generalize previous work on the channel capacity of protocols. Further, we present analyses on three well known protocols, namely Dining Cryptographers, Crowds and Onion Routing to demonstrate the application of our methodology.