Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymity vs. Information Leakage in Anonymity Systems
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Anonymity and covert channels in simple timed mix-firewalls
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Statistical measurement of information leakage
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
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Information theory turned out to be very useful in analyzing anonymity attacks in general. The concept of channel information leak is a good indicator of how successful an attack can be. While different information leak measures exist in the literature, the problem of representing anonymity systems using noisy channels has not been well studied. The main goal of this paper is to show how anonymity attacks on mix systems can be formally represented as noisy channels in the information-theoretic sense. This formal representation provides a deeper understanding of mix systems and prepares the field for a more rigorous and accurate analysis of possible attacks. We performed empirical analysis using three information leak measures (mutual information, KLSD, and Min-entropy) which revealed interesting findings about some mix variants. This paper tries to bridge the gap between theory and practice in the field of anonymous communication systems.