A probabilistic approach to information hiding
Programming methodology
Estimation of entropy and mutual information
Neural Computation
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Distribution of mutual information for robust feature selection
Distribution of mutual information for robust feature selection
Anonymity vs. Information Leakage in Anonymity Systems
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language
Journal of Computer Security
Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Information-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis of Interrupt-Related Covert Channels
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
The bayesian traffic analysis of mix networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Measuring anonymity with relative entropy
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Information theory and security: quantitative information flow
SFM'10 Proceedings of the Formal methods for quantitative aspects of programming languages, and 10th international conference on School on formal methods for the design of computer, communication and software systems
Non-uniform distributions in quantitative information-flow
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Anonymity attacks on mix systems: a formal analysis
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Squeeziness: An information theoretic measure for avoiding fault masking
Information Processing Letters
Calculating bounds on information leakage using two-bit patterns
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 6th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Quantitative program dependence graphs
ICFEM'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Formal Engineering Methods: formal methods and software engineering
A tool for estimating information leakage
CAV'13 Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
QUAIL: a quantitative security analyzer for imperative code
CAV'13 Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
SAT-Based analysis and quantification of information flow in programs
QEST'13 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems
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Information theory provides a range of useful methods to analyse probability distributions and these techniques have been successfully applied to measure information flow and the loss of anonymity in secure systems. However, previous work has tended to assume that the exact probabilities of every action are known, or that the system is non-deterministic. In this paper, we show that measures of information leakage based on mutual information and capacity can be calculated, automatically, from trial runs of a system alone. We find a confidence interval for this estimate based on the number of possible inputs, observations and samples. We have developed a tool to automatically perform this analysis and we demonstrate our method by analysing a Mixminon anonymous remailer node.