Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
Revisiting a combinatorial approach toward measuring anonymity
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Bounds on the Leakage of the Input's Distribution in Information-Hiding Protocols
Trustworthy Global Computing
Survey on anonymity in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
A Combinatorial Approach for an Anonymity Metric
ACISP '09 Proceedings of the 14th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Quantitative Notions of Leakage for One-try Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Formal approaches to information-hiding (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Compositionality of secure information flow
MPC'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mathematics of program construction
Quantitative information flow and applications to differential privacy
Foundations of security analysis and design VI
Low-cost mitigation of privacy loss due to radiometric identification
VANET '11 Proceedings of the Eighth ACM international workshop on Vehicular inter-networking
Anonymity attacks on mix systems: a formal analysis
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Measuring query privacy in location-based services
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
Statistical measurement of information leakage
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
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Measures for anonymity in systems must be on one hand simple and concise, and on the other hand reflect the realities of real systems. Such systems are heterogeneous, as are the ways they are used, the deployed anonymity measures, and finally the possible attack methods. Implementation quality and topologies of the anonymity measures must be considered as well. We therefore propose a new measure for the anonymity degree, which takes into account possible heterogeneity. We model the effectiveness of single mixes or of mix networks in terms of information leakage and measure it in terms of covert channel capacity. The relationship between the anonymity degree and information leakage is described, and an example is shown.