The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Covert channels and anonymizing networks
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Anonymity vs. Information Leakage in Anonymity Systems
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Probability of Error in Information-Hiding Protocols
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
Quantified Interference for a While Language
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Adversaries and information leaks (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
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In information-hiding, an adversary that tries to infer the secret information has a higher probability of success if it knows the distribution on the secrets. We show that if the system leaks probabilistically some information about the secrets, (that is, if there is a probabilistic correlation between the secrets and some observables) then the adversary can approximate such distribution by repeating the observations. More precisely, it can approximate the distribution on the observables by computing their frequencies, and then derive the distribution on the secrets by using the correlation in the inverse direction. We illustrate this method, and then we study the bounds on the approximation error associated with it, for various natural notions of error. As a case study, we apply our results to Crowds, a protocol for anonymous communication.