Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Bounds on the Leakage of the Input's Distribution in Information-Hiding Protocols
Trustworthy Global Computing
Quantifying information leakage in process calculi
Information and Computation
Vida: How to Use Bayesian Inference to De-anonymize Persistent Communications
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Unifying Probability with Nondeterminism
FM '09 Proceedings of the 2nd World Congress on Formal Methods
Probabilistic anonymity via coalgebraic simulations
Theoretical Computer Science
Compositional methods for information-hiding
FOSSACS'08/ETAPS'08 Proceedings of the Theory and practice of software, 11th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures
Formal approaches to information-hiding (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Compositional closure for Bayes Risk in probabilistic noninterference
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming: Part II
Trust in crowds: probabilistic behaviour in anonymity protocols
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
Leakage quantification of cryptographic operations
OTM'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems - Volume Part I
On the relation between differential privacy and quantitative information flow
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Probable innocence in the presence of independent knowledge
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
A Kantorovich-Monadic Powerdomain for Information Hiding, with Probability and Nondeterminism
LICS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 27th Annual IEEE/ACM Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
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Randomized protocols for hiding private information can fruitfully be regarded as noisy channels in the information-theoretic sense, and the inference of the concealed information can be regarded as a hypothesis-testing problem. We consider the Bayesian approach to the problem, and investigate the probability of error associated to the inference when the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability) decision rule is adopted. Our main result is a constructive characterization of a convex base of the probability of error, which allows us to compute its maximum value (over all possible input distributions), and to identify upper bounds for it in terms of simple functions. As a side result, we are able to improve substantially the Hellman-Raviv and the Santhi-Vardy bounds expressed in terms of conditional entropy. We then discuss an application of our methodology to the Crowds protocol, and in particular we show how to compute the bounds on the probability that an adversary breaks anonymity.