Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communications of the ACM
On the Incomparability of Entropy and Marginal Guesswork in Brute-Force Attacks
INDOCRYPT '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Progress in Cryptology
Non-Interference: Who Needs It?
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Probability of Error in Information-Hiding Protocols
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Quantifying information leakage in process calculi
Information and Computation
Solving Linear Programs Using Multiparty Computation
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Performance Comparison of Secure Comparison Protocols
DEXA '09 Proceedings of the 2009 20th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Application
Multiparty computation for interval, equality, and comparison without bit-decomposition protocol
PKC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Practice and theory in public-key cryptography
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Adversaries and information leaks (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Secure computation of the mean and related statistics
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
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Perfectly secure protocols are often too inefficient performance wise to be used in a practical setting. On the other hand, an insecure (but faster) protocol might be deemed secure for a particular setting. Recent research has thus focused on precise leakage quantification of a security protocol. In this context, we first give precise leakage quantification of a basic cryptographic primitive, that of multiplicative hiding. We then show how the approach can be extended to compute worst case leakage bounds of arbitrary compositions of cryptographic operations. The composition results make our bounds applicable to a wide range of general security protocols.