The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Covert channels and anonymizing networks
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Measuring the confinement of probabilistic systems
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
Quantified Interference for a While Language
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Measuring anonymity with relative entropy
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Authentication theory and hypothesis testing
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A Bayesian Model for Event-based Trust
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Quantitative analysis of leakage for multi-threaded programs
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Epistemic Strategies and Games on Concurrent Processes
SOFSEM '09 Proceedings of the 35th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Quantifying information leakage in process calculi
Information and Computation
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Measuring anonymity with relative entropy
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Towards a formal framework for computational trust
FMCO'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Formal methods for components and objects
The optimum leakage principle for analyzing multi-threaded programs
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
Leakage quantification of cryptographic operations
OTM'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems - Volume Part I
Quantitative analysis of information flow using theorem proving
ICFEM'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Formal Engineering Methods: formal methods and software engineering
QUAIL: a quantitative security analyzer for imperative code
CAV'13 Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
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We propose a framework in which anonymity protocols are interpreted as particular kinds of channels, and the degree of anonymity provided by the protocol as the converse of the channel's capacity. We also investigate how the adversary can test the system to try to infer the user's identity, and we study how his probability of success depends on the characteristics of the channel. We then illustrate how various notions of anonymity can be expressed in this framework, and show the relation with some definitions of probabilistic anonymity in literature.