The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Probabilistic simulations for probabilistic processes
Nordic Journal of Computing
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Limiting privacy breaches in privacy preserving data mining
Proceedings of the twenty-second ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
PRISM 2.0: A Tool for Probabilistic Model Checking
QEST '04 Proceedings of the The Quantitative Evaluation of Systems, First International Conference
A randomized encoding of the π-calculus with mixed choice
Theoretical Computer Science - Process algebra
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: a modular approach
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Bounds on the Leakage of the Input's Distribution in Information-Hiding Protocols
Trustworthy Global Computing
Probabilistic anonymity via coalgebraic simulations
Theoretical Computer Science
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Formal approaches to information-hiding (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Calibrating the power of schedulers for probabilistic polynomial-time calculus
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
Weak bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed Automata
Theoretical Computer Science
CONCUR'10 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Concurrency theory
Trust in crowds: probabilistic behaviour in anonymity protocols
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
Minimising anonymity loss in anonymity networks under DoS attacks
ICICS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information and communications security
Probable innocence in the presence of independent knowledge
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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In this paper we propose a formalization of probable innocence, a notion of probabilistic anonymity that is associated to "realistic" protocols such as Crowds. We analyze critically two different definitions of probable innocence from the literature. The first one, corresponding to the property that Reiter and Rubin have proved for Crowds, aims at limiting the probability of detection. The second one, by Halpern and O'Neill, aims at constraining the attacker's confidence. Our proposal combines the spirit of both these definitions while generalizing them. In particular, our definition does not need symmetry assumptions, and it does not depend on the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest. We show that, in case of a symmetric system, our definition corresponds exactly to the one of Reiter and Rubin. Furthermore, in the case of users with uniform probabilities, it amounts to a property similar to that of Halpern and O'Neill.Another contribution of our paper is the study of probable innocence in the case of protocol composition, namely when multiple runs of the same protocol can be linked, as in the case of Crowds.