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Anonymity means that the identity of the user performing a certain action is maintained secret. The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms which can be described probabilistically. In this paper we propose a notion of weak probabilistic anonymity, where weak refers to the fact that some amount of probabilistic information may be revealed by the protocol. This information can be used by an observer to infer the likeliness that the action has been performed by a certain user. The aim of this work is to study the degree of anonymity that the protocol can still ensure, despite the leakage of information. We illustrate our ideas by using the example of the dining cryptographers with biased coins. We consider both the cases of nondeterministic and probabilistic users. Correspondingly, we propose two notions of weak anonymity and we investigate their respective dependencies on the biased factor of the coins.