Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Syntactic control of interference
POPL '78 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN symposium on Principles of programming languages
A probabilistic approach to information hiding
Programming methodology
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Quantitative analysis of leakage for multi-threaded programs
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
A simulation-based proof technique for dynamic information flow
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language
Journal of Computer Security
Quantitative information flow as network flow capacity
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
A Monotonicity Principle for Information Theory
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Bounds on the Leakage of the Input's Distribution in Information-Hiding Protocols
Trustworthy Global Computing
Catch me if you can: permissive yet secure error handling
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Quantifying information flow with beliefs
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Compositional methods for information-hiding
FOSSACS'08/ETAPS'08 Proceedings of the Theory and practice of software, 11th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures
Formal approaches to information-hiding (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Risk assessment of security threats for looping constructs
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
The optimum leakage principle for analyzing multi-threaded programs
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
Information flow in interactive systems
CONCUR'10 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Concurrency theory
On bounding problems of quantitative information flow
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
A probabilistic property-specific approach to information flow
MMM-ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architectures for Computer Network Security
On bounding problems of quantitative information flow
Journal of Computer Security - ESORICS 2010
Quantitative information flow in interactive systems
Journal of Computer Security - ARSPA-WITS'10
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
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We show how information theory can be used to give a quantitative definition of interference between variables in imperative programming languages. In this paper we focus on a particular case of this definition of interference: leakage of information from private variables to public ones in While language programs. The major result of the paper is a quantitative analysis for this language that employs a use-definition graph to calculate bounds on the leakage into each variable.