Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Information flow inference for ML
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information flow inference for ML
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Eliminating Covert Flows with Minimum Typings
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Fine-Grained Information Flow Analysis for a \lambda Calculus with Sum Types
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security
High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security
Lenient Array Operations for Practical Secure Information Flow
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Enforcing security and safety models with an information flow analysis tool
Proceedings of the 2004 annual ACM SIGAda international conference on Ada: The engineering of correct and reliable software for real-time & distributed systems using Ada and related technologies
Non-interference for a JVM-like language
TLDI '05 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGPLAN international workshop on Types in languages design and implementation
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Deriving an Information Flow Checker and Certifying Compiler for Java
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Noninterference in the Presence of Non-Opaque Pointers
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Jifclipse: development tools for security-typed languages
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Quantified Interference for a While Language
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A certified lightweight non-interference java bytecode verifier
ESOP'07 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Programming
Polyglot: an extensible compiler framework for Java
CC'03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Compiler construction
Security-typed languages for implementation of cryptographic protocols: a case study
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Permissive dynamic information flow analysis
PLAS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
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Program errors are a source of information leaks. Tracking these leaks is hard because error propagation breaks out of program structure. Programming languages often feature exception constructs to provide some structure to error handling: for example, the try...catch blocks in Java and Caml. Mainstream information-flow security compilers such as Jif and FlowCaml enforce rigid rules for exceptions in order to prevent leaks via public side effects of computation whose reachability depends on exceptions. This paper presents a general and permissive alternative to the rigid solution: the programmer is offered a choice for each type of error/exception whether to handle it or not. The security mechanism ensures that, in the former case, it is never handled and, in the latter case, it is always handled with the mainstream restrictions. This mechanism extends naturally to a language with procedures and output, where we show the soundness of the mechanism with respect to termination-insensitive noninterference.