A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Measuring the confinement of probabilistic systems
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
Quantitative analysis of leakage for multi-threaded programs
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language
Journal of Computer Security
Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Automatic Discovery and Quantification of Information Leaks
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Quantified Interference for a While Language
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Risk assessment of security threats for looping constructs
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
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Bellman's optimality principle is a method for solving problems where one needs to find best decisions one after another. The principle can be extended to assess the information leakage in multithreaded programs, and is formalized into the optimum leakage principle hereby proposed in this paper. By modeling the state transitions in multithreaded programs, the principle is combined with information theory to assess the leakage in multi-threaded programs, as the result of an optimal policy. This offers a new perspective to measure the information leakage and enables to track the leakage at run-time. Examples are given to demonstrate the analysis process. Finally, efficient implementation of this methodology is also briefly discussed.