Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Cryptography and data security
Cryptography and data security
Principles of Program Analysis
Principles of Program Analysis
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A New Type System for Secure Information Flow
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A logical approach to multilevel security of probabilistic systems
Distributed Computing
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Securing Interaction between Threads and the Scheduler
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language
Journal of Computer Security
Quantified Interference for a While Language
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Closing internal timing channels by transformation
ASIAN'06 Proceedings of the 11th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: secure software and related issues
Quantifying information leakage in process calculi
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Risk assessment of security threats for looping constructs
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
Information theory and security: quantitative information flow
SFM'10 Proceedings of the Formal methods for quantitative aspects of programming languages, and 10th international conference on School on formal methods for the design of computer, communication and software systems
The optimum leakage principle for analyzing multi-threaded programs
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
Formal Verification of Differential Privacy for Interactive Systems (Extended Abstract)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Probable innocence in the presence of independent knowledge
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Value-passing CCS with noisy channels
Theoretical Computer Science
Confidentiality for probabilistic multi-threaded programs and its verification
ESSoS'13 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
Practical probability: applying pGCL to lattice scheduling
ITP'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Interactive Theorem Proving
Effective verification of confidentiality for multi-threaded programs
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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We present a quantitative analysis of information flow for a multi-threaded language based on a probabilistic scheduler. The analysis consists of two steps. First, multi-threaded programs are translated into single-thread looping programs with a probabilistic operator. Then an information theoretical semantics of loops with probabilistic operators is used to derive the leakage. Using this analysis classical examples of multi-threaded programs are revisited: it is shown how the analysis is able to deal with, among other, probabilistic leakage, internally observable timing leakage and leakage originated by observing intermediate states of computation