Reasoning about knowledge
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Information flow inference for ML
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Analyzing consistency of security policies
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The UCONABC usage control model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Owned Policies for Information Security
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
TARK '94 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Security policies for downgrading
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Downgrading policies and relaxed noninterference
Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On flow-sensitive security types
Conference record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information-Flow Security for Interactive Programs
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On the modeling and analysis of obligations
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Deductive Algorithmic Knowledge
Journal of Logic and Computation
Secrecy and anonymity in interactive systems
Secrecy and anonymity in interactive systems
Localized delimited release: combining the what and where dimensions of information release
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Gradual Release: Unifying Declassification, Encryption and Key Release Policies
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automaton-based Confidentiality Monitoring of Concurrent Programs
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Verified enforcement of stateful information release policies
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Expressive Declassification Policies and Modular Static Enforcement
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Flow-sensitive semantics for dynamic information flow policies
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Tight Enforcement of Information-Release Policies for Dynamic Languages
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Quantified Interference for a While Language
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Paralocks: role-based information flow control and beyond
Proceedings of the 37th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Declassification with explicit reference points
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Enforcing non-safety security policies with program monitors
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Flow locks: towards a core calculus for dynamic flow policies
ESOP'06 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
What, indeed, is intransitive noninterference?
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Obligations and their interaction with programs
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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Many computer systems have a functional requirement to release information. Such requirements are an important part of a system's information security requirements. Current information-flow control techniques are able to reason about permitted information flows, but not required information flows.In this paper, we introduce and explore the specification and enforcement of required information release in a language-based setting. We define semantic security conditions that express both what information a program is required to release, and how an observer is able to learn this information. We also consider the relationship between permitted and required information release, and define bounded release, which provides upper-and lower-bounds on the information a program releases. We show that both required information release and bounded release can be enforced using a security-type system.