Secure slices of insecure programs
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Securing information flow via dynamic capture of dependencies
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
A language for information flow: dynamic tracking in multiple interdependent dimensions
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Information flow testing: the third path towards confidentiality guarantee
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Tracking information flow in dynamic tree structures
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
From dynamic to static and back: riding the roller coaster of information-flow control research
PSI'09 Proceedings of the 7th international Andrei Ershov Memorial conference on Perspectives of Systems Informatics
Runtime enforcement of information flow security in tree manipulating processes
ESSoS'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
Optimized inlining of runtime monitors
NordSec'11 Proceedings of the 16th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Addressing covert termination and timing channels in concurrent information flow systems
Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Functional programming
On-the-Fly inlining of dynamic dependency monitors for secure information flow
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Static enforcement of information flow policies for a concurrent JVM-like language
TGC'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Trustworthy Global Computing
Towards a practical secure concurrent language
Proceedings of the ACM international conference on Object oriented programming systems languages and applications
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
Effective verification of confidentiality for multi-threaded programs
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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Noninterference is typically used as a baseline security policy to formalize confidentiality of secret information manipulated by a program. In contrast to static checking of noninterference, this paper considers dynamic, automaton-based, monitoring of information flow for a single execution of a concurrent program. The monitoring mechanism is based on a combination of dynamic and static analyses. During program execution, abstractions of program events are sent to the automaton, which uses the abstractions to track information flows and to control the execution by forbidding or editing dangerous actions. All monitored executions are proved to be noninterfering (soundness) and executions of programs that are well-typed in a security type system similar to the one of Smith and Volpano [23] are proved to be unaltered by the monitor (partial transparency).