Localized delimited release: combining the what and where dimensions of information release
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Towards a logical account of declassification
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
On the computational soundness of cryptographically masked flows
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Cryptographically-masked flows
Theoretical Computer Science
Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
ESOP '09 Proceedings of the 18th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Encoding information flow in Aura
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Flow-sensitive semantics for dynamic information flow policies
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Encoding information flow in AURA
ACM SIGPLAN Notices
Paralocks: role-based information flow control and beyond
Proceedings of the 37th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Handling dynamic information release
ICISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Declassification with explicit reference points
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
AuraConf: a unified approach to authorization and confidentiality
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Types in language design and implementation
Unifying facets of information integrity
ICISS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information systems security
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Semantics and enforcement of expressive information flow policies
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Modelling declassification policies using abstract domain completeness
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science - Programming Language Interference and Dependence
Epistemic temporal logic for information flow security
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 6th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
A semantic framework for declassification and endorsement
ESOP'10 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
A semantic hierarchy for erasure policies
ICISS'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Systems Security
Scheduler-Independent declassification
MPC'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Mathematics of Program Construction
Precise enforcement of progress-sensitive security
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards a practical secure concurrent language
Proceedings of the ACM international conference on Object oriented programming systems languages and applications
Dependent Type Theory for Verification of Information Flow and Access Control Policies
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
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Information security has a challenge to address: enabling information-flow controls with expressive information release (or declassification) policies. Existing approaches tend to address some aspects of information release, exposing the other aspects for possible attacks. It is striking that these approaches fall into two mostly separate categories: revelation-based (as in information purchase, aggregate computation, moves in a game, etc.) and encryption-based declassification (as in sending encrypted secrets over an untrusted network, storing passwords, etc.). This paper introduces gradual release, a policy that unifies declassification, encryption, and key release policies. We model an attacker's knowledge by the sets of possible secret inputs as functions of publicly observable outputs. The essence of gradual release is that this knowledge must remain constant between releases. Gradual release turns out to be a powerful foundation for release policies, which we demonstrate by formally connecting revelation-based and encryption-based declassification. Furthermore, we show that gradual release can be provably enforced by security types and effects.