Modelling declassification policies using abstract domain completeness

  • Authors:
  • Isabella Mastroeni;Anindya Banerjee

  • Affiliations:
  • Università di verona, verona, italy email: isabella.mastroeni@univr.it;Imdea software institute, madrid, spain email: anindya.banerjee@imdea.org

  • Venue:
  • Mathematical Structures in Computer Science - Programming Language Interference and Dependence
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

This paper explores a three dimensional characterisation of a declassification-based non-interference policy and its consequences. Two of the dimensions consist of specifying: (a)the power of the attacker, that is, what public information a program has that an attacker can observe; and(b)what secret information a program has that needs to be protected. Both these dimensions are regulated by the third dimension: (c)the choice of program semantics, for example, trace semantics or denotational semantics, or any semantics in Cousot's semantics hierarchy. To check whether a program satisfies a non-interference policy, one can compute an abstract domain that over-approximates the information released by the policy and then check whether program execution can release more information than permitted by the policy. Counterexamples to a policy can be generated by using a variant of the Paige-Tarjan algorithm for partition refinement. Given the counterexamples, the policy can be refined so that the least amount of confidential information required for making the program secure is declassified.