On the computational soundness of cryptographically masked flows

  • Authors:
  • Peeter Laud

  • Affiliations:
  • Tartu University and Cybernetica AS, Tartu, Estonia

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

To speak about the security of information flow in programs employing cryptographic operations, definitions based on computational indistinguish ability of distributions over program states have to be used. These definitions, as well as the accompanying analysis tools, are complex and error-prone to argue about. Cryptographically masked flows, proposed by Askarov, Hedin and Sabelfeld, are an abstract execution model and security definition that attempt to abstract away the details of computational security. This abstract model is useful because analysis of programs can be conducted using the usual techniques for enforcing non-interference. In this paper we investigate under which conditions this abstract model is computationally sound, i.e. when does the security of a program in their model imply the computational security of this program. This paper spells out a reasonable set of conditions and then proposes a simpler abstract model that is nevertheless no more restrictive than the cryptographically masked flows together with these conditions for soundness.