ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Verifying secrets and relative secrecy
Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow
ESOP '01 Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus and Security Protocol Analysis
ESOP '01 Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Encryption-Scheme Security in the Presence of Key-Dependent Messages
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Confidentiality for Mobile Code: The Case of a Simple Payment Protocol
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secure Introduction of One-Way Functions
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Security policies for downgrading
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secrecy despite compromise: types, cryptography, and the pi-calculus
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Enforcing robust declassification and qualified robustness
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW17
On the secure implementation of security protocols
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Handling encryption in an analysis for secure information flow
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Noninterference and the composability of security properties
SP'88 Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
A type system for computationally secure information flow
FCT'05 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Security-typed languages for implementation of cryptographic protocols: a case study
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Cryptographically sound implementations for typed information-flow security
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
On the computational soundness of cryptographically masked flows
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information flow security of multi-threaded distributed programs
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Securing nonintrusive web encryption through information flow
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Cryptographically-masked flows
Theoretical Computer Science
Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
ESOP '09 Proceedings of the 18th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Adversaries and information leaks (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Refinement types for secure implementations
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
AuraConf: a unified approach to authorization and confidentiality
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Types in language design and implementation
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Information-flow types for homomorphic encryptions
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure information flow for distributed systems
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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Cryptographic operations are essential for many security-critical systems. Reasoning about information flow in such systems is challenging because typical (noninterference-based) information-flow definitions allow no flow from secret to public data. Unfortunately, this implies that programs with encryption are ruled out because encrypted output depends on secret inputs: the plaintext and the key. However, it is desirable to allow flows arising from encryption with secret keys provided that the underlying cryptographic algorithm is strong enough. In this paper we conservatively extend the noninterference definition to allow safe encryption, decryption, and key generation. To illustrate the usefulness of this approach, we propose (and implement) a type system that guarantees noninterference for a small imperative language with primitive cryptographic operations. The type system prevents dangerous program behavior (e.g., giving away a secret key or confusing keys and non-keys), which we exemplify with secure implementations of cryptographic protocols. Because the model is based on a standard noninterference property, it allows us to develop some natural extensions. In particular, we consider public-key cryptography and integrity, which accommodate reasoning about primitives that are vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attacks.