A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Noninterference for Concurrent Programs
ICALP '01 Proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
Eliminating Covert Flows with Minimum Typings
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secure Introduction of One-Way Functions
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security
High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security
A New Type System for Secure Information Flow
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Enforcing security and safety models with an information flow analysis tool
Proceedings of the 2004 annual ACM SIGAda international conference on Ada: The engineering of correct and reliable software for real-time & distributed systems using Ada and related technologies
Gradual Release: Unifying Declassification, Encryption and Key Release Policies
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Cryptographically-Masked flows
SAS'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Static Analysis
A type system for computationally secure information flow
FCT'05 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Match it or die: proving integrity by equality
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
From exponential to polynomial-time security typing via principal types
ESOP'11/ETAPS'11 Proceedings of the 20th European conference on Programming languages and systems: part of the joint European conferences on theory and practice of software
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Precise enforcement of progress-sensitive security
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Tools for analysing secure information flow are almost exclusively based on ideas going back to Denning's work from the 70's. This approach embodies an imperfect notion of security which turns a blind eye to information flows which are encoded in the termination behaviour of a program. In exchange for this weakness many more programs are deemed "secure", using conditions which are easy to check. Previously it was thought that such leaks are limited to at most one bit per run. Recent work by Askarov et al (ESORICS'08) offers some bad news and some good news: the bad news is that for programs which perform output, the amount of information leaked by a Denning style analysis is not bounded; the good news is that if secrets are chosen to be sufficiently large and sufficiently random then they cannot be effectively leaked at all. The problem addressed in this paper is that secrets cannot always be made sufficiently large or sufficiently random. Contrast, for example, an encryption key with an "hasHIV"-field of a patient record. In recognition of this we develop a notion of secret-sensitive noninterference in which "small" secrets are handled more carefully than "big" ones. We illustrate the idea with a type system which combines a liberal Denning-style analysis with a more restrictive system according to the nature of the secrets at hand.