Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Formal Eavesdropping and Its Computational Interpretation
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Noninterference for Concurrent Programs
ICALP '01 Proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
Eliminating Covert Flows with Minimum Typings
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secure Introduction of One-Way Functions
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A New Type System for Secure Information Flow
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On the computational soundness of cryptographically masked flows
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information flow security of multi-threaded distributed programs
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
ESOP '09 Proceedings of the 18th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Declassification: Dimensions and principles
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
Type-based analysis of PIN processing APIs
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Match it or die: proving integrity by equality
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
Match it or die: proving integrity by equality
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
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Cryptographic hash functions are commonly used as modification detection codes. The goal is to provide message integrity assurance by comparing the digest of the original message with the hash of what is thought to be the intended message. This paper generalizes this idea by applying it to general expressions instead of just digests: success of an equality test between a tainted data and a trusted one can be seen as a proof of high-integrity for the first item. Secure usage of hash functions is also studied with respect to the confidentiality of digests by extending secret-sensitive noninterference of Demange and Sands.