A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Quantitative Information Flow, Relations and Polymorphic Types
Journal of Logic and Computation
Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure information flow with random assignment and encryption
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Fast probabilistic simulation, nontermination, and secure information flow
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
A Cryptographic Decentralized Label Model
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cryptographically sound implementations for typed information-flow security
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
On the computational soundness of cryptographically masked flows
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
Comparative branching-time semantics for Markov chains
Information and Computation
Handling encryption in an analysis for secure information flow
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Computationally sound typing for non-interference: the case of deterministic encryption
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Cryptographically-Masked flows
SAS'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Static Analysis
A type system for computationally secure information flow
FCT'05 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Bounds on the Leakage of the Input's Distribution in Information-Hiding Protocols
Trustworthy Global Computing
Quantitative Notions of Leakage for One-try Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Compositional closure for Bayes Risk in probabilistic noninterference
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming: Part II
Leakage quantification of cryptographic operations
OTM'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems - Volume Part I
A Kantorovich-Monadic Powerdomain for Information Hiding, with Probability and Nondeterminism
LICS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 27th Annual IEEE/ACM Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Elementary probability theory in the eindhoven style
MPC'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Mathematics of Program Construction
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Secure information flow analysis aims to prevent programs from leaking their H (high) inputs to their L (low) outputs. A major challenge in this area is to relax the standard noninterference properties to allow "small" leaks, while still preserving security. In this tutorial paper, we consider three instances of this theme. First, we consider a type system that enforces the usual Denning restrictions, except that it specifies that encrypting a H plaintext yields a L ciphertext. We argue that this type system ensures security, assuming strong encryption, by giving a reduction that maps a noninterference adversary (which tries to guess which of two H inputs was used, given the L outputs) to an IND-CPA adversary (which tries to guess which of two plaintexts are encrypted, given the ciphertext). Second, we explore termination leaks in probabilistic programs when typed under the Denning restrictions. Using a notion of probabilistic simulation, we show that such programs satisfy an approximate noninterference property, provided that their probability of nontermination is small. Third, we consider quantitative information flow, which aims to measure the amount of information leaked. We argue that the common information-theoretic measures in the literature are unsuitable, because these measures fail to distinguish between programs that are wildly different from the point of view of an adversary trying to guess the H input.