Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Covert channels and anonymizing networks
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Anonymity vs. Information Leakage in Anonymity Systems
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Quantitative Information Flow, Relations and Polymorphic Types
Journal of Logic and Computation
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Adversaries and information leaks (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Information theory and security: quantitative information flow
SFM'10 Proceedings of the Formal methods for quantitative aspects of programming languages, and 10th international conference on School on formal methods for the design of computer, communication and software systems
Compositional closure for Bayes Risk in probabilistic noninterference
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming: Part II
Asymptotic information leakage under one-try attacks
FOSSACS'11/ETAPS'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures: part of the joint European conferences on theory and practice of software
On the relation between differential privacy and quantitative information flow
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Quantitative information flow, with a view
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Calculating bounds on information leakage using two-bit patterns
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 6th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Computing the leakage of information-hiding systems
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
A Kantorovich-Monadic Powerdomain for Information Hiding, with Probability and Nondeterminism
LICS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 27th Annual IEEE/ACM Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Automatic quantification of cache side-channels
CAV'12 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Differential privacy: on the trade-off between utility and information leakage
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Min-Entropy leakage of channels in cascade
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Worst- and average-case privacy breaches in randomization mechanisms
TCS'12 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP TC 1/WG 202 international conference on Theoretical Computer Science
A differentially private mechanism of optimal utility for a region of priors
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
On bounding problems of quantitative information flow
Journal of Computer Security - ESORICS 2010
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Recent research in quantitative theories for information-hiding topics, such as Anonymity and Secure Information Flow, tend to converge towards the idea of modeling the system as a noisy channel in the information-theoretic sense. The notion of information leakage, or vulnerability of the system, has been related in some approaches to the concept of mutual information of the channel. A recent work of Smith has shown, however, that if the attack consists in one single try, then the mutual information and other concepts based on Shannon entropy are not suitable, and he has proposed to use Renyi's min-entropy instead. In this paper, we consider and compare two different possibilities of defining the leakage, based on the Bayes risk, a concept related to Renyi min-entropy.