Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Information-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis of Interrupt-Related Covert Channels
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Quantifying information leakage in process calculi
Information and Computation
Quantitative Notions of Leakage for One-try Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A Provably Secure and Efficient Countermeasure against Timing Attacks
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Compositional methods for information-hiding
FOSSACS'08/ETAPS'08 Proceedings of the Theory and practice of software, 11th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures
Vulnerability Bounds and Leakage Resilience of Blinded Cryptography under Timing Attacks
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
QEST '10 Proceedings of the 2010 Seventh International Conference on the Quantitative Evaluation of Systems
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
On the relation between differential privacy and quantitative information flow
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Quantitative information flow, with a view
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Worst- and average-case privacy breaches in randomization mechanisms
TCS'12 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP TC 1/WG 202 international conference on Theoretical Computer Science
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We study the asymptotic behaviour of (a) information leakage and (b) adversary's error probability in information hiding systems modelled as noisy channels. Specifically, we assume the attacker can make a single guess after observing n independent executions of the system, throughout which the secret information is kept fixed. We show that the asymptotic behaviour of quantities (a) and (b) can be determined in a simple way from the channel matrix. Moreover, simple and tight bounds on them as functions of n show that the convergence is exponential. We also discuss feasible methods to evaluate the rate of convergence. Our results cover both the Bayesian case, where a prior probability distribution on the secrets is assumed known to the attacker, and the maximum-likelihood case, where the attacker does not know such distribution. In the Bayesian case, we identify the distributions that maximize the leakage. We consider both the min-entropy setting studied by Smith and the additive form recently proposed by Braun et al., and show the two forms do agree asymptotically. Next, we extend these results to a more sophisticated eavesdropping scenario, where the attacker can perform a (noisy) observation at each state of the computation and the systems are modelled as hidden Markov models.