A pump for rapid, reliable, secure communication
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Shared resource matrix methodology: an approach to identifying storage and timing channels
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
A Practical Approach to Identifying Storage and Timing Channels: Twenty Years Later
ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Introducing Noise into the Bus-Contention Channel
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An Analysis of the Timed Z-channel
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The Pump: A Decade of Covert Fun
ACSAC '05 Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Automatic Analysis of the NRL Pump
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Noisy timing channels with binary inputs and outputs
IH'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information hiding
Hiding information in multi level security systems
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
An information-theoretic and game-theoretic study of timing channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Asymptotic information leakage under one-try attacks
FOSSACS'11/ETAPS'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures: part of the joint European conferences on theory and practice of software
Statistical measurement of information leakage
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
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We present a formal model for analyzing the bandwidth of covert channels. The focus is on channels that exploit interrupt-driven communication, which have been shown to pose a serious threat in practical experiments. Our work builds on our earlier model [1], which we used to compare the effectiveness of different countermeasures against such channels. The main novel contribution of this article is an approach to exploiting detailed knowledge about a given channel in order to make the bandwidth analysis more precise.