The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Communication and concurrency
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Modeling and verification of randomized distributed real-time systems
Modeling and verification of randomized distributed real-time systems
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Probabilistic simulations for probabilistic processes
Nordic Journal of Computing
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Covert channels and anonymizing networks
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
A randomized encoding of the π-calculus with mixed choice
Theoretical Computer Science - Process algebra
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Probability of Error in Information-Hiding Protocols
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
Quantified Interference for a While Language
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Compositional reasoning for probabilistic finite-state behaviors
Processes, Terms and Cycles
Making random choices invisible to the scheduler
CONCUR'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Concurrency Theory
Quantifying information leakage in process calculi
Information and Computation
Formal approaches to information-hiding (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Compositional closure for Bayes Risk in probabilistic noninterference
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming: Part II
Compositionality of secure information flow
MPC'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mathematics of program construction
Trust in crowds: probabilistic behaviour in anonymity protocols
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
Asymptotic information leakage under one-try attacks
FOSSACS'11/ETAPS'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures: part of the joint European conferences on theory and practice of software
On the relation between differential privacy and quantitative information flow
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Quantitative information flow, with a view
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Probable innocence in the presence of independent knowledge
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
A Kantorovich-Monadic Powerdomain for Information Hiding, with Probability and Nondeterminism
LICS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 27th Annual IEEE/ACM Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Differential privacy: on the trade-off between utility and information leakage
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Protocols for information-hiding often use randomized primitives to obfuscate the link between the observables and the information to be protected. The degree of protection provided by a protocol can be expressed in terms of the probability of error associated to the inference of the secret information. We consider a probabilistic process calculus approach to the specification of such protocols, and we study how the operators affect the probability of error. In particular, we characterize constructs that have the property of not decreasing the degree of protection, and that can therefore be considered safe in the modular construction of protocols. As a case study, we apply these techniques to the Dining Cryptographers, and we are able to derive a generalization of Chaum's strong anonymity result.