The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
On the Incomparability of Entropy and Marginal Guesswork in Brute-Force Attacks
INDOCRYPT '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Progress in Cryptology
Abstraction, Refinement And Proof For Probabilistic Systems (Monographs in Computer Science)
Abstraction, Refinement And Proof For Probabilistic Systems (Monographs in Computer Science)
Probability of Error in Information-Hiding Protocols
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Shadow Knows: Refinement and security in sequential programs
Science of Computer Programming
Quantitative Notions of Leakage for One-try Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Sums and Lovers: Case Studies in Security, Compositionality and Refinement
FM '09 Proceedings of the 2nd World Congress on Formal Methods
Compositional methods for information-hiding
FOSSACS'08/ETAPS'08 Proceedings of the Theory and practice of software, 11th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures
Adversaries and information leaks (Tutorial)
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
On the relation between differential privacy and quantitative information flow
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
A Kantorovich-Monadic Powerdomain for Information Hiding, with Probability and Nondeterminism
LICS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 27th Annual IEEE/ACM Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Elementary probability theory in the eindhoven style
MPC'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Mathematics of Program Construction
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We give a quantitative sequential model for noninterference security with probability (but not demonic choice), and a novel refinement order that we prove to be the greatest compositional relation consistent with an "elementary" order based on Bayes Risk. This compositional closure complements our earlier work defining refinement similarly for qualitative noninterference with demonic choice (but not probability). The Three-Judges Protocol illustrates our model's utility: with compositionality, the embedded sub-protocols can be treated in isolation.