The complexity of approximating entropy
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Introduction to Functional Programming
Introduction to Functional Programming
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Digital Systems with Algorithm Implementation
Digital Systems with Algorithm Implementation
Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Quantitative Information Flow, Relations and Polymorphic Types
Journal of Logic and Computation
An interactive codesign environment for domain-specific coprocessors
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Remote timing attacks are practical
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A block cipher based pseudo random number generator secure against side-channel key recovery
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Information Theoretic Evaluation of Side-Channel Resistant Logic Styles
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Towards security limits in side-channel attacks
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Automatically deriving information-theoretic bounds for adaptive side-channel attacks
Journal of Computer Security
Asymptotic information leakage under one-try attacks
FOSSACS'11/ETAPS'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures: part of the joint European conferences on theory and practice of software
Quantitative information flow, with a view
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Statistical measurement of information leakage
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
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We propose a novel approach for quantifying a system's resistance to unknown-message side-channel attacks. The approach is based on a measure of the secret information that an attacker can extract from a system from a given number of side-channel measurements. We provide an algorithm to compute this measure, and we use it to analyze the resistance of hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms with respect to timing attacks. In particular, we show that message-blinding --- the common countermeasure against timing attacks --- reduces the rate at which information about the secret is leaked, but that the complete information is still eventually revealed. Finally, we compare information measures corresponding to unknown-message, known-message, and chosen-message attackers and show that they form a strict hierarchy.