A Provably Secure and Efficient Countermeasure against Timing Attacks

Authors:
Boris Köpf;Markus Dürmuth
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We show that the amount of information about the key that anunknown-message attacker can extract from a deterministicside-channel is bounded from above by |O| log (n+1) bits, wheren is the number of side-channel measurements and O is the set ofpossible observations.We use this bound to derive a novelcountermeasure against timing attacks, where the strength of thesecurity guarantee can be freely traded for the resultingperformance penalty. We give algorithms that efficiently andoptimally adjust this trade-off for given constraints on theside-channel leakage or on the efficiency of thecryptosystem. Finally, we perform a case-study that shows thatapplying our countermeasure leads to implementations with minorperformance overhead and formal security guarantees.