A decentralized model for information flow control
Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Journal of Functional Programming
Enforcing robust declassification and qualified robustness
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW17
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Gradual Release: Unifying Declassification, Encryption and Key Release Policies
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secure web applications via automatic partitioning
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Expressive Declassification Policies and Modular Static Enforcement
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
A weakest precondition approach to active attacks analysis
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Flow-sensitive semantics for dynamic information flow policies
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Tight Enforcement of Information-Release Policies for Dynamic Languages
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Declassification: Dimensions and principles
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
Security-typed languages for implementation of cryptographic protocols: a case study
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A lattice-based approach to mashup security
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Unifying facets of information integrity
ICISS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information systems security
Compiling information-flow security to minimal trusted computing bases
ESOP'11/ETAPS'11 Proceedings of the 20th European conference on Programming languages and systems: part of the joint European conferences on theory and practice of software
EnerJ: approximate data types for safe and general low-power computation
Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Multiple facets for dynamic information flow
POPL '12 Proceedings of the 39th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Decentralized delimited release
APLAS'11 Proceedings of the 9th Asian conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Model checking information flow in reactive systems
VMCAI'12 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
User-aware privacy control via extended static-information-flow analysis
Proceedings of the 27th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering
Faceted execution of policy-agnostic programs
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Dependent Type Theory for Verification of Information Flow and Access Control Policies
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
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Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced declassification mechanisms for relaxing confidentiality policies, and endorsement mechanisms for relaxing integrity policies. However, a continuing challenge has been to define what security is guaranteed when such mechanisms are used. This paper presents a new semantic framework for expressing security policies for declassification and endorsement in a language-based setting. The key insight is that security can be described in terms of the power that declassification and endorsement give the attacker. The new framework specifies how attacker controlled code affects program execution and what the attacker is able to learn from observable effects of this code. This approach yields novel security conditions for checked endorsements and robust integrity. The framework is flexible enough to recover and to improve on the previously introduced notions of robustness and qualified robustness. Further, the new security conditions can be soundly enforced by a security type system. The applicability and enforcement of the new policies is illustrated through various examples, including data sanitization and authentication.