Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
AUSCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the international conference on cryptology on Advances in cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Concrete Mathematics: A Foundation for Computer Science
Concrete Mathematics: A Foundation for Computer Science
Almost entirely correct mixing with applications to voting
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Payment Systems and Credential Mechanisms with Provable Security Against Abuse by Individuals
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Proceedings of the International Conference on Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms
Probabilistic Treatment of MIXes to Hamper Traffic Analysis
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Reasoning about the anonymity provided by pool mixes that generate dummy traffic
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
A privacy-protecting coupon system
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Provable anonymity for networks of mixes
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
Linking anonymous transactions: the consistent view attack
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Measuring unlinkability revisited
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Revisiting a combinatorial approach toward measuring anonymity
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Using Linkability Information to Attack Mix-Based Anonymity Services
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Evaluating adversarial partitions
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Relations among privacy notions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A Proposal for a Privacy-preserving National Identity Card
Transactions on Data Privacy
Probable innocence in the presence of independent knowledge
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
The challenges raised by the privacy-preserving identity card
Cryptography and Security
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A system that protects the unlinkability of certain data items (e. g. identifiers of communication partners, messages, pseudonyms, transactions, votes) does not leak information that would enable an adversary to link these items. The adversary could, however, take advantage of hints from the context in which the system operates. In this paper, we introduce a new metric that enables one to quantify the (un)linkability of the data items and, based on this, we consider the effect of some simple contextual hints.